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ABSTRACT
An increase in adoption of video surveillance, affecting many
aspects of daily lives, raises public concern about an intrusion
into individual privacy. New sensing and surveillance tech-
nologies, such as mini-drones, threaten to eradicate bound-
aries of private space even more. Therefore, it is important
to study the effect of mini-drones on privacy intrusion and
to understand how existing protection privacy filters per-
form on a video captured by a mini-drone. To this end, we
have built a publicly available video dataset of typical drone-
based surveillance sequences in a car parking. Using the
sequences from this dataset, we assessed five privacy pro-
tection filters at different strength levels via a crowdsourcing
evaluation. We asked crowdsourcing workers several privacy-
and surveillance-related questions to determine the tradeoff
between intelligibility of the scene and privacy protection
provided by the filters.
Index Terms— Video surveillance, mini-drones, dataset,
privacy, crowdsourcing evaluation
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the advances in microelectronics, signal pro-
cessing, and aerodynamics led to the popularity of unmanned
aerial vehicles and mini-drones in particular. Drones are com-
monly used in applications such as military, surveillance, pho-
tography, cinema, entertainment, and agriculture. They can
operate at different heights, can capture the same scene at dif-
ferent angles, and can get closer to targets. As a consequence,
they can be used to spy on individuals and collect sensitive
surveillance data, which adds a new threat to privacy and calls
for appropriate privacy protection solutions [1, 2].
This paper addresses the privacy issues in drone-based
video surveillance systems. To better understand the impli-
cations of using drone-based surveillance, a publicly avail-
able video dataset1 was created with a DJI Phantom 2 Vision+
mini-drone. The dataset is specifically designed for the analy-
sis and evaluation of privacy issues. It consists of 38 different
This work was conducted in the framework of Network of Excellence
VideoSense and COST Action IC1206. Special thanks to Dr. Jens Ha¨lterlein
and Dr. Leon Hempel for the valuable discussions about ethical problems in
surveillance and help in the dataset and evaluation criteria in tests.
1http://mmspg.epfl.ch/mini-drone
sequences that depict a typical surveillance scenario in a park-
ing lot exposing different levels of privacy intrusiveness.
To understand and quantify the balance between privacy
of people under surveillance and security-related features, a
subjective evaluation approach proposed in [3] was adapted to
evaluate several privacy filters, such as blurring, pixelization,
masking, warping [4], and morphing [5]. The filters were
applied with different degrees of strength on video sequences
from the created mini-drone dataset. The performance of each
privacy filter was subjectively evaluated using a crowdsourc-
ing method, since this approach was shown as a viable al-
ternative to lab-based subjective assessments [6, 7]. For this
purpose, the open-source framework QualityCrowd2 [8] was
adapted and crowdsourcing workers were employed from Mi-
croworkers2 platform. The workers were asked to answer
carefully selected questions related to visual privacy and typi-
cal surveillance tasks, in order to assess performance of visual
privacy protection filters. The results allowed us to investi-
gate the balance each filter can offer between intelligibility
and privacy protection.
2. DATASET
The created dataset consists of 38 different contents captured
in full HD, with a duration of 16 to 24 seconds each, shot
with DJI Phantom 2 Vision+ mini-drone in a parking lot (see
the sample frame in Figure 1a). The dataset shows different
people and accessories in various situations, viewing angles,
and lighting conditions (day and evening). The contents can
be clustered in three categories: normal, suspicious, and illicit
behaviors. Normal behavior includes people walking, getting
in and parking their cars. The suspicious content, a priori
nothing wrong happens but people display questionable be-
havior, such as loitering or taking pictures of parked cars. Il-
licit behaviors shows people mis-parking their vehicles, steal-
ing items and cars, or fighting. The impact on the privacy of
those under surveillance is variable, because of the different
ways the drone is able to capture video. To emphasize the dif-
ferences with respect to conventional CCTV surveillance, the
drone maneuvered by hovering at different heights, following,
getting closer to, or rotating around an object of interest.
2http://microworkers.com/
(a) Annotated original (b) Blurring (40) (c) Pixelization (20) (d) Masking (0.8) (e) Morphing (0.95) (f) Warping (5)
Fig. 1: Original frame of stealing bag video from the mini-drone dataset and a filtered cropped region (strength is in brackets).
Table 1: Questions asked in the crowdsourcing study (left column) and the choice of the answers (right column).
Question Choice of answers
1. What is the main ACTIVITY happening in the video? Stealing a car, attacking a driver, stealing an item,
walking, parking a car, taking pictures, I do not know
2. How many PEOPLE do you see? One, two, three, four, five, I do not know
3. Is there any of the following ITEMS? (select all that apply) Backpack, umbrella, photo camera, papers, wallet,
none, I do not know
4. What is the GENDER of the person in the red box? Male, female, I do not know
5. What is the ETHNICITY of the person in the red box? White, African, Asian, I do not know
6. Which ACCESSORIES does the person in the red box wear? Jacket, sunglasses, glasses, helmet, shorts, hat, hoodie,
(select all that apply) none of the above, I do not know
The contents in the dataset provide a variety of personal
visual information. The sensitive regions in each content,
including faces, body silhouettes, accessories, cars bodies,
and license plates, are manually annotated and recorded in
an XML format.
3. VISUAL PRIVACY FILTERS
Several state-of-the-art tools for privacy protection have been
previously applied to surveillance-related video datasets [3,
6]. Based on these studies, a number of protection tools were
chosen for testing on mini-drone videos, including blurring,
pixelization, and masking filters, as well as more complex
reversible filters such as warping [4] and morphing [5]. To
investigate their performance, four levels of strength were se-
lected for each filter. The choice of the filters parameters
is a challenging issue by itself, because sudden perspective
changes of the on-board camera result in a change of size for
privacy sensitive regions. The approach suggested in [9] was
adopted, which focuses on the performance of recognition al-
gorithms in privacy evaluation. The strength levels were se-
lected to fit into the following four categories: (i) mild, when
the filter is hard to notice, (ii) noticeable, when the filtered
region is generally visible but some minor details such as li-
cense plates are unclear, (iii) obfuscating, when most of the
protected objects are visually concealed, and (iv) completely
obfuscating when the filter yields its maximum protection.
Based on the above considerations, the strength for blur-
ring filter was adjusted by changing the Gaussian kernel size
to values 5, 20, 40, and 60; for pixelization filter, the size of
the averaging block to values 5, 10, 20, and 50; for masking
filter, the opacity to values 0.2, 0.6, 0.8, and 1.0; for warping
filter, the distance for the shifted points to values 1, 2, 5, and
20; and for morphing filter, the weight of the pixel intensities
to values 0.1, 0.4, 0.8, and 0.95. Examples of filtered video
frames are shown in Figure 1.
For the crowdsourcing evaluations, privacy protection fil-
ters were applied to body silhouettes and cars, which, conse-
quently, also obfuscated faces, license plates, and accessories.
4. EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
The goal of the subjective assessment based on the crowd-
sourcing approach is to understand whether a given surveil-
lance task can be performed or an individual’s behavior can
be detected, even after the privacy protection filters are ap-
plied. At the same time, the effectiveness of privacy protec-
tion filters is assessed by determining the degree by which
the individual identities in the sequences remain hidden. For
this purpose, each crowdsourcing worker was asked to watch
a video sequence and to answer to one of the questions in
Table 1, as per the approach proposed in [3]. Also, each ques-
tion had an accompanied question about certainty (‘How sure
are you?’). A red box was drawn in the video to avoid con-
fusion regarding the person to which questions 4, 5 and 6 in
Table 1 referred to. The Microworkers2 platform allows em-
ployers to choose the location of workers, which was selected
in countries where English is a dominant language.
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Fig. 2: Results of crowdsourcing evaluation for different fil-
ters and their strength. Left column shows the correct answers
by workers. Right column shows the ‘certain & correct’, ‘cer-
tain & incorrect’, and ‘uncertain’ answers.
Seven different contents were selected from the dataset to
evaluate the performance of the privacy tools. They show a
variety of sensitive regions and individuals behavior. Origi-
nal sequences in 1920× 1080 resolution were compressed in
MPEG-4, converted to Flash Video format, and played back
at a resolution of 960 × 540 to make sure the video could be
properly viewed using most common browsers and monitors.
In total, 21 different video sequences were created for
each content (the original, plus 20 filtered versions) for as-
sessment. To ensure a statistically significant number of eval-
uations for each sequence, and considering the presence of
unreliable workers (about 50% in a typical crowdsourcing
evaluation), 40 workers evaluated each sequence, with a to-
tal of 840 workers performing the corwdsourcing task.
The sequences corresponding to the same content were
randomly distributed among different tasks with special care
devoted to guaranteeing that a particular content was used
only once in every task, i.e., that each worker assessed only
one version of a given content.
5. EVALUATION RESULTS
5.1. Reliable workers detection
A major shortcoming of the crowdsourcing-based subjective
evaluation is that the employer is unable to supervise the be-
havior of online workers and to ensure the similarity of test
conditions in all evaluations. This leads to a risk of includ-
ing unreliable data into the analysis, for instance, due to the
different environment, lighting conditions, or untrusted work-
ers who submit low quality work to reduce their effort while
maximizing their compensation [10].
By following recommendations in [10], we first detected
unreliable workers using two ‘Honeypot’ questions inserted
in each task. Honeypot questions are obvious easy-to-answer
questions for detecting people who did not pay attention. In
addition, for each worker, the following time-based metrics
were used: (i) task completion time, (ii) mean time spent on
each question in a task, and (iii) standard deviation of the time
spent on each question. These metrics allow removing the
results from workers who are very different from average, for
instance, if they take too long to finish the task or time to
answer each question varies drastically. In total, 456 out of
840 (54% of total) workers were found to be reliable with 19
to 24 reliable workers for each tested video sequence, which
insures the statistical significance of the evaluation results.
5.2. Evaluation Analysis
Figure 2 demonstrates the crowdsourcing evaluation results
for each privacy protection filter and their different strength
levels. In the figure, the bars are grouped according to the
questions from Table 1. Each plot also shows the results for
original video sequence for the ease of comparison.
Fig. 3: Privacy vs. intelligibility tradeoff for each filter.
The left column of Figure 2 shows how each filter af-
fects the visibility of different regions when applied at dif-
ferent strengths. The bars represent the average percentage of
correct answers across different video contents (7 were used
in the evaluation). The average standard deviation of correct
answers is about 18% with less than 10% for original ‘unfil-
tered’ video and from about 10% (minimal strength levels) to
28% (high strength levels) for filtered video. Such high devia-
tion values are probably due to the significantly varying video
content used in the evaluation with scenes ranging from those
with high motion, when the mini-drone was moving and cir-
cling at high speed, to static close-up scenes. It means that
the number of correct answers, for both privacy and intelligi-
bility, not only depends on filter and its strength but also on
the type of the content.
The right column of Figure 2 illustrates the effects of
filters strength levels on certainty, with which workers re-
sponded to accompanied questions about certainty of their
answers to the main questions. Hence, the total number of
answers are split into those that were ‘certain & correct’, ‘cer-
tain & incorrect’, and ‘uncertain’. An ideal privacy protection
filter should lead to high uncertainty but very low number of
‘certain & incorrect’ answers, because surveillance related
judgements based on wrong information are undesirable, for
instance, when a guard decides to ignore an activity, because
of wrongly attributing it to a normal behavior, when it is not.
Figure 2 demonstrates a general trend: application of fil-
ters with high strength levels decreases the number of cor-
rect answers to all questions. The least affected are questions
about the number of people and gender. Such decrease in cor-
rect answers is desirable for questions related to privacy but
not for questions related to intelligibility, because it makes
filtered video to be less useful for surveillance purposes.
To understand the effect of the privacy tools on the trade-
off between privacy and intelligibility, the answers to the first
3 questions were averaged to compute the intelligibility score,
while privacy score was computed from the last 3 questions
as a difference between total and correct answers (the less
number of people answer correctly to privacy question, the
better is the protection). The resulted scores are presented
as a scatter plot in Figure 3, where the different point mark-
ers correspond to different filters with the respective strength
level shown above each point. The scores for original un-
filtered video are indicated by dashed horizontal and vertical
lines. The figure demonstrates a tradeoff similar to that re-
ported in [6] with filters able to either achieve high intelligi-
bility with sacrifice in privacy, for low filter strength levels,
or high privacy but with low intelligibility, i.e., usefulness in
terms of surveillance, for high filter strength levels.
From Figure 3, it can be noted that basic filters such
as blurring and pixelization lead to more suitable privacy-
intelligibility tradeoffs in practical applications, since their
values cluster around the middle of the plot. Also, from Fig-
ure 2b, blurring leads to lesser number of ‘certain & incorrect’
answers. Morphing, especially at high strength levels, leads
to a lot of ‘certain & incorrect’ answers for questions about
activity, items, and gender (see Figure 2h), but it is proba-
bly due to the type of morphing filter applied (a cartoonish
‘Queen of England’) and may lead to a different conclusion
if a different type of morphing target is used.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we have investigated for the first time the per-
formance of privacy protection filters in drone-based video
surveillance. Five typical privacy protection tools were ap-
plied with four different levels of strength. The filtered se-
quences have been evaluated by the workers of a crowdsourc-
ing platform, and the results have been analyzed to investigate
the balance between intelligibility and privacy protection.
The subjective assessment with crowdsourcing approach
suggests that the pixelization and blurring filters can be effec-
tively controlled: the intelligibility decreases and the privacy
protection smoothly increases by increasing the strength pa-
rameters. The masking tool with opacity 1 shows the lowest
privacy intrusiveness; unexpectedly, the ability to perform the
surveillance task was preserved since the drone’s perspective
view permits to exploit the shadows of people and objects.
Morphing with the highest strength value is similar to mask-
ing, while the warping tool did not show a large variability.
As future work, the evaluations should also include other
advanced privacy protection filters such as scrambling [11]
or encryption-based [12] tools. Crowdsourcing results could
also be compared with lab-based evaluations. Different ques-
tions could also be selected, for example, related to the age
and the expression of the person. Also, since drone-based
videos are significantly more challenging for video analytics
than typical CCTV video, specialized new approaches can be
developed for an automated detection of privacy-sensitive ob-
jects, e.g., person tracking or license plate recognition.
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